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“A SIMPLE SUCKING OF THE TEETH:”  
BECKETT, DANTE AND THE “RISUS PURUS”  
 
SCOTT ANNETT, University of Cambridge 
 
 
 
Samuel Beckett’s “Dante postcards” record the first three smiles to be found 
in the Purgatorio. In doing so, Becket draws attention to a gesture that has 
recently received significant critical attention within Dante studies. These 
postcards suggest Beckett’s alertness to the complexity of face to face encoun-
ters within the Commedia, while also providing an opportunity to consider 
the extent to which facial expressions are significant within Beckett’s own 
writing. In this essay, I argue that the postcards can be read alongside Beckett’s 
early novels, in particular Murphy (English 1938, French 1947) and Watt 
(English 1953, French 1968). Moreover, I explore the extent to which Beck-
ett’s readings of Dante are multifaceted in that they demonstrate the extent to 
which he was both inspired by, and yet also at odds with, his Italian predeces-
sor. 
 
Keywords: Samuel Beckett, Dante, Face, Smile, Communication 
 
 
  
Samuel Beckett’s “Dante postcards”, which are held at Reading 
University Library, are clear evidence of his close and recurrent 
readings of the Commedia.1 These postcards consist of three un-
dated, loose cards on which Beckett made some brief, handwritten 
notes. These notes include line-referenced quotations from the first 
five canti of the Purgatorio, Beckett’s own observations regarding 
the structure of the Commedia, and some extracts from an unat-
tributed Italian commentary. They also record the first three smiles 
in the Purgatorio, and in doing so they bear witness to the tanta-
lizing fact that smiles were a particular feature of Dante’s writing 
that had caught his attention.  
 Indeed, the sharpness of Beckett’s reading is corroborated by 
 
1 “Dante postcards,” RUL, MS 4123. See also Beckett at Reading: Catalogue of the 
Beckett Manuscript Collection at The University of Reading, ed. Mary Bryden, Jul-
ian Garforth and Peter Mills (Reading: Whiteknights Press and the Beckett Founda-
tion, 1998). Dante’s significance to Beckett has been explored by a number of schol-
ars, including in particular Daniella Caselli in Beckett’s Dantes: Intertextuality in the 
fiction and criticism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005).  
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the scholars to have since argued that, within the Commedia, 
Dante transforms the smile into a key component of his poetic vo-
cabulary.2 This gesture is a site of precisely the kind of interpersonal 
acceptance and resistance to which both authors were sensitive. 
The first smile noted by Beckett is that of Dante’s old friend, Ca-
sella, in Purgatorio 2. Upon recognizing Casella, we are told that 
Dante advances to embrace him but that their embrace proves to 
be impossible:  
   
 Oi ombre vane, fuor che ne l’aspetto!  
 tre volte dietro a lei le mani avvinsi,  
 e tante mi tornai con esse al petto. (Purg. 2. 79-81)                              
 
It is Dante’s wonder at their failure to embrace that causes Casella 
to smile: “Di maraviglia, credo, mi dipinsi; / per che l’ombra sorrise 
e si ritrasse.” (Purg. 2. 82-83) In this moment, Casella reads and 
interprets the expression on Dante’s face, in turn responding with 
a complex communicative gesture of his own: his smile simultane-
ously suggests recognition, intimacy and amusement at his friend’s 
confusion.  
 The second smile noted by Beckett occurs a canto later and 
is that of Manfred, the son of Emperor Frederick II. Manfred ini-
tially offers his wounds as identifying marks, before smiling (“Poi 
sorridendo”) and naming himself: “Io son Manfredi.” (Purg. 3.111) 
Dante presents Manfred as an unusually attractive nobleman and in 
the postcards Beckett quotes from an unattributed critical work, 
which emphasizes that “Manfredi è l’unico personaggio che Dante 
descrive nei suoi particolari felici mittendone in risalto la straordi-
naria bellezza.” Beckett then copies a line from Purgatorio 3: 
“biondo era e bello e di gentile aspetto.” (Purg. 3.107) Crucially, 
the smiles of both Casella and Manfred occur when attention is 
drawn to the bodies of the purgatorial shades, while the smiles 
themselves act as modes of communication between individuals: 
Casella’s smile communicates amusement at Dante’s confusion as 
well as recognition of his friend, while Manfred’s expression is the 
reassuring smile of a stranger forming a social connection and 
 
2 Sorriso/sorridere and riso/ridere are used interchangeably throughout the Comme-
dia. See Peter S. Hawkins, “All Smiles: Poetry and Theology in Dante,” in Dante’s 
Commedia: Theology as Poetry, eds. Vittorio Montemaggi and Matthew Treherne 
(South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010). Claudia Villa discusses the 
connections between Horace, ineffability and smiles in the Paradiso. Claudia Villa, 
“Il problema dello stile umile (e il riso di Dante),” in Zygmunt Barański and Martin 
L. McLaughlin eds., Dante the Lyric and Ethical Poet (Oxford: Legenda, 2010). Fi-
nally, see also Heather Webb, Dante’s Persons: An Ethics of the Transhuman (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2016).  
2
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perhaps also contains a hint of wry amusement at Dante’s initial 
failure to recognize him.  
 The third and final smile referenced by Beckett in his post-
cards is that of Dante himself, who smiles when he sees Belacqua 
seated beneath a rock midway up Mount Purgatory. Mary Bryden 
describes this smile as being prompted “both by the sudden recog-
nition of his lutemaker friend and by a spontaneous amusement at 
his languid leg-pulling.”3 This smile is remarkable because it is, as 
Beckett notes in the postcards, “D’s 1st smile,” or as he will put it 
later in Compagnie / Company (1980), “Dante’s first quarter-
smile.”4 Following his encounters with Casella and Manfred, 
Dante’s “quarter-smile” is a sign that he has once again become 
able to respond to other individuals with an expressive reciprocity 
and openness beyond the less delicate, and as Virgil makes clear in 
Inferno 20, less appropriate, expressions of pity presented in Hell.5 
 As mentioned above, Beckett’s “Dante postcards” are un-
dated, and as such a degree of tentativeness is necessary when draw-
ing specific texts into their orbit. At the same time, Beckett’s note-
taking habits were particularly concentrated throughout the 1930s, 
and both John Pilling and Matthew Feldman have demonstrated 
the interconnectedness between Beckett’s notes and the texts writ-
ten in this period.6 With this in mind, and without attempting to 
pin a specific date to the postcards, this essay suggests that the notes 
were taken early in Beckett’s career, most likely in the mid-1930s, 
and that they were influential in shaping the issues examined in two 
of his early novels: Murphy (English 1938, French 1947) and Watt 
(English 1953, French 1968). Both of these texts pay considerable 
attention to faces and facial expressions, reflecting upon a number 
of the questions posed implicitly by the postcards.  
 On the second page of Murphy, there is an account of the 
eponymous hero’s farewell from Neary, a man under whom he 
“had lately studied”:  
 
 
3 Mary Bryden, “Beckett and the Three Dantean Smiles,” Journal of Beckett Studies 
4, no. 2 (1995): 31. 
4 Samuel Beckett, Company (London: Calder, 1980, repr. 2003), 85. 
5 See Inf. 5.139-142 and Inf. 20.25-27.  
6 See John Pilling and Mary Bryden, eds., The Ideal Core of the Onion: Reading 
Beckett Archives (Reading: Beckett International Foundation, 1992) and Pilling’s ar-
ticle “Dates and Difficulties, Beckett’s Whoroscope Notebook,” in Dirk Van Hulle, 
ed., Beckett the European (Tallahassee, Florida: Journal of Beckett Studies Books, 
2005). See also Matthew Feldman, Beckett’s Books: A Cultural History of Samuel 
Beckett’s ‘Interwar Notes’ (London; New York: Continuum, 2006, repr. 2008) and 
Erik Tonning, Matthew Feldman, Matthijs Engelberts, and Dirk van Hulle eds. Sam-
uel Beckett: Debts and Legacies (Amsterdam; New York: Rodopi, 2010).  
3
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  “Murphy, all life is figure and ground.” 
  “But a wandering to find home,” said Murphy. 
  “The face,” said Neary, “or system of faces, against the big 
blooming buzzing confusion. I think of Miss Dwyer.”7 
 
John Fletcher places Neary’s assertion that “all life is figure and 
ground” in the context of pre-Socratic philosophy,8 but James 
Acheson more convincingly argues that Neary’s contribution to the 
exchange is based on the work of “two famous psychologists, Edgar 
Rubin and William James.”9 By arguing that “all life is figure and 
ground,” Neary alludes to Rubin’s argument that “we make sense 
of sense data by distinguishing perceptually between ‘the figure, the 
substantial appearance of objects, and the ground, the [...] environ-
ment in which [objects are] placed’”.10 As such, Neary claims that 
what we see in “life” depends on the way in which we see; each 
individual attempts to make sense of the world by distinguishing 
between an object and its surroundings, by deciding what to focus 
on amidst the confusion. 
 Murphy’s reply to Neary could be heard as a qualification, 
so that “all life” may well be “figure and ground” except for “a 
wandering to find home,” or it may be an alternative conclusion to 
the formulation “all life is,” implying that for Murphy “all life is 
[...] But a wandering to find home,” that is, “all life” is nothing 
more than a “wandering to find home.” In either case, this is an 
admission of dislocation: the one definite truth for Murphy is that 
“all life” consists of a search for “home.” Neary’s response to Mur-
phy’s assertion can be heard either as a dismissal, so that Neary ig-
nores Murphy as he continues with his own train of thought, or as 
a further nuancing, so that Neary suggests “home” is in fact the 
“face” or “system of faces.” By changing our perspectives, Neary 
may imply, it is possible to render the “face” or “system of faces” a 
point (or points) of orientation “against” the “big blooming buzz-
ing confusion” in the background. 
 Neary’s emphasis on the “face” may provide an alternative 
to the solipsism and self-love in which Murphy indulges through-
out the novel.11 In doing so, Neary calls to mind the later work of 
 
7 Samuel Beckett, Murphy (London: Calder, 1963, repr. 1993), 6. 
8 John Fletcher, “Samuel Beckett and the Philosophers,” Comparative Literature 
17, no.1 (Winter, 1965): 43. 
9 James Acheson, “Murphy’s Metaphysics,” in S.E. Gontarski, ed., The Beckett Stud-
ies Reader (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), 80. 
10 Ibid. Acheson is quoting Robert I. Watson, The Great Psychologists: From Aris-
totle to Freud (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1968), 439. 
11 See in particular Chapter 6 of Murphy, on Murphy’s mind, which includes the 
epigraph: “Amor intellectualis quo Murphy se ipsum amat.” Beckett, Murphy, 63. 
4
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Emmanuel Levinas, of whom Robert Gordon writes: “the roots of 
the ethical lie in the encounter between two people, each looking 
at the other, acknowledging and recognizing the other, in particu-
lar acknowledging the ‘otherness’ of the other.” Gordon continues: 
“Two subjects enter the realm of the ethical in the act of facing 
each other, of facing up to each other and their own ethical sub-
jecthood, of asking for a mark of the self in the other and vice versa: 
what Levinas calls the ‘face to face’”.12 This “‘face to face’” en-
counter is a forceful summoning, indeed it is a summoning “prior 
to ontology and thus prior to the very foundations of the Western 
philosophical tradition and its notion of the self.”13  
 For Levinas, thought “alert to the face of the other” is the 
“thought of irreducible difference,” and this awareness of alterity is 
so radical that it demands both a response and an acknowledgement 
of responsibility.14 In Éthique comme philosophie première, 
Levinas argues that “C’est précisément dans ce rappel de ma re-
sponsabilité par le visage qui m’assigne, qui me demande, qui me 
réclame, c’est dans cette mise en question qu’autrui est prochain.”15 
The progression in Levinas’s sentence from a summoning, to a call 
and finally a plaintive request (“qui me réclame”) emphasises the 
complexity of this encounter, the extent to which it is double-
sided, uncertain and yet at the same time irreducible.  
 For Neary, the “face” or “system of faces” is mentioned with 
Miss Dwyer in mind and the conversation between the two men 
develops into a discussion about love, and then Murphy’s apparent 
incapacity to love. Neary admits that “To gain the affections of 
Miss Dwyer [...] would benefit me no end,” to which Murphy re-
torts: “And then? [...] Back to Tenerife and the apes?”16 In prepar-
ing his psychology notes while living in London between Decem-
ber 1933 and December 1935, Beckett read both Robert Wood-
worth’s Contemporary Schools of Psychology (1931) and Wolf-
gang Köhler’s The Mentality of Apes (1927), making notes on 
Köhler’s experiments with apes in Tenerife between 1913 and 
 
This phrase has its origins in the writings of both Spinoza and Geulincx. See Fletcher, 
“Samuel Beckett and the Philosophers,” Comparative Literature 17, no.1 (Winter, 
1965): 54. 
12 Robert Gordon, Primo Levi’s Ordinary Virtues: From Testimony to Ethics (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 40. 
13 Ibid., 18-19.  
14 Emmanuel Levinas, “Beyond Intentionality,” in Alan Montefiore, ed., Philosophy 
in France Today (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 108. 
15 Emmanuel Levinas, Éthique comme philosophie première, préfacé et annoté par 
Jacques Rolland (Paris: Payot & Rivages, 1998), 97.  
16 Beckett, Murphy, 7. 
5
Annett: “A SIMPLE SUCKING OF THE TEETH”
Published by ScholarlyCommons, 2019
 Annett: “A Simple Sucking of Teeth” 
 
 
~ 112 ~ 
 
1917.17 In mentioning “Tenerife and the apes,” Murphy refers to 
Köhler’s experiments, which led, as Shane Weller explains, to Köh-
ler challenging “E. L. Thorndike’s argument that, unlike human 
beings, ‘Animals learn, neither by reasoning nor by imitation, but 
by trial and error’”: 
 
In his The Mentality of Apes (1917; English translation, 1925), Köhler 
addresses the question of “whether the chimpanzee, representing prob-
ably the most intelligent group of subhuman animals, showed any gen-
uine intelligence” (Woodworth 142). His conclusion is that in fact apes 
learn not simply through “trial and error” (transcribed by Beckett as 
“trial and terror”) but also through “insight.” 
 
There is an irony in Murphy’s choice of reference because, as 
Weller goes on to observe, “for Köhler, the strict Cartesian distinc-
tion between human and animal is simply untenable.”18 Murphy 
attempts to maintain a split between body and mind, to seek refuge 
in his “little world” by appeasing his body and avoiding the “big 
world,” and yet at the same time he also cites a text (whether con-
sciously or not) that disputes the claims of Descartes.19  
 Nevertheless, the primary sense in which Murphy refers to 
the apes is to compare Neary’s desire for Miss Dwyer to an ape’s 
desire for a banana, which in turn casts doubt upon the wider, met-
aphysical significance of love:  
   
Of such was Neary’s love for Miss Dwyer, who loved a Flight-Lieuten-
ant Elliman, who loved a Miss Farren of Ringsakiddy, who loved a Fa-
ther Fitt of Ballinclashet, who in all sincerity was bound to acknowledge 
a certain vocation for a Mrs West of Passage, who loved Neary. 
  “Love requited,” said Neary, “is a short circuit,” a ball that gave 
rise to a sparkling rally. 
  “The love that lifts up its eyes,” said Neary, “being in torment; 
that craves for the tip of her little finger, dipped in lacquer, to cool its 
tongue - is foreign to you, Murphy, I take it.” 
  “Greek,” said Murphy. 
  “Or put it another way,” said Neary; “the single, brilliant, 
 
17 Robert Woodworth, Contemporary Schools of Psychology (London: Methuen, 
1931); Wolfgang Köhler, The Mentality of Apes (2nd rev. ed. London: K. Paul 
Trench, Trübner & Co., 1927). See TCD MS 10971/7 and 10971/8. These notes 
are dated between December 1933 and December 1935, which was when Beckett 
began writing Murphy. See also Matthijs Engelberts and Everett Frost eds., Notes 
Diverse Holo: Catalogues of Beckett’s reading notes and other manuscripts at Trinity 
College Dublin (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi Press, 2006), 158-66. 
18 Shane Weller, “Not Rightly Human: Beckett and Animality,” in Minako Okamuro 
ed., Borderless Beckett / Beckett sans frontières: Tokyo 2006 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
2008), 216. 
19 Beckett, Murphy, 101. 
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organized compact blotch in the tumult of heterogeneous stimulation.”  
  “Blotch is the word,” said Murphy. 
  “Just so,” said Neary. “Now pay attention to this. For whatever 
reason you cannot love - But there is a Miss Counihan, Murphy, is there 
not?”20  
 
The “blotch” referred to by Neary might be a face set against the 
background of “heterogeneous stimulation,” while Murphy’s at-
tentiveness to Neary’s terms (“Blotch is the word”) emphasises his 
own reluctance to engage in such messy, interpersonal encounters. 
Murphy agrees that love as described by Neary is foreign to him 
(“Greek”) and Neary concludes by acknowledging that for “what-
ever reason,” Murphy “cannot love.” In fact, he seems to prove as 
much by asking Murphy “to define let us say your commerce with 
this Miss Counihan.” Murphy replies, “Precordial [..] rather than 
cordial. Tired. Cork County. Depraved.” Neary acknowledges that 
Murphy’s “heart is as it is,” musing that his “conarium” or pineal 
gland may well have “shrunk to nothing,”21 the “conarium” being 
for Descartes the point of connection between body and mind and 
so, as Descartes puts it himself, the “principle seat of the soul.”22 In 
Neary’s view, the connection between Murphy’s body and mind 
has been utterly severed, while he may also be implying (depending 
on how well he knows his Descartes) that Murphy is literally soul-
less.  
 Yet Neary’s question regarding Miss Counihan is the correct 
one. For while Murphy may have no feelings for Miss Counihan, 
he is not without feelings altogether: “The part of him that he hated 
craved for Celia, the part that he loved shriveled up at the thought 
of her. The voice lamented faintly against his flesh.”23 In contrast 
to Neary’s suggestion, Murphy’s “conarium” cannot have “shrunk 
to nothing”; his mind and body remain in tension, his conscious-
ness (“voice”) lamenting “faintly against his flesh.” A little later, 
Celia discovers Murphy tied to his chair but now with “the rock-
ing-chair [...] on top”:  
 
“Who are you?” said Murphy. Celia mentioned her name. Murphy, un-
able to believe his ears, opened his eyes. The beloved features emerging 
from chaos were the face against the big blooming buzzing confusion of 
 
20 Ibid., 7. 
21 Ibid., 8. 
22 This phrase is taken from a letter that Descartes wrote on 29th January 1640. Des-
cartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. III: The Correspondence, trans. 
John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 143. 
23 Beckett, Murphy, 10. 
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which Neary had spoken so highly. He closed his eyes and opened his 
arms. She sank down athwart his breast, their heads were side by side on 
the pillow but facing opposite ways, his fingers strayed through her yel-
low hair. It was the short circuit so earnestly desired by Neary, the flare 
of pursuit and flight extinguished.24  
 
In Murphy’s terms, Celia’s “beloved features” emerge “from 
chaos,” and he goes on to acknowledge the equivalence of this ex-
perience with Neary’s earlier description: the “beloved features 
emerging from the chaos were the face against the big blooming 
buzzing confusion of which Neary had spoken so highly.” Despite 
his own resistance, Murphy has found a “figure” (Celia’s face) 
against the “ground” (the “chaos”).  
 It would seem then that an individual might orientate herself 
amidst the chaos of experience by attending closely to the faces of 
others. However, such attention is not straightforwardly positive; 
rather it contains a “mixture” of responses, much as Beckett himself 
described when outlining his own attitude to Murphy: “the mix-
ture of compassion, patience, mockery and ‘tat twam asi.’” 25 A look 
of exactly this kind occurs when Celia encounters Miss Carridge: 
 
A long look of fellow-feeling filled the space between them, with calm, 
pity and a touch of contempt. They leaned against it as against a solid 
wall of wool and looked at each other across it. Then they continued on 
their ways, Miss Carridge down what stairs remained, Celia into their 
old room.26  
 
The look shared by Miss Carridge and Celia is simultaneously a 
look of acceptance and resistance. The sympathetic act of “fellow-
feeling” exchanged between these women does not consist of a 
look of pure pity but rather is mingled with a “touch of contempt.” 
There is something supportive about the “wall of wool” against 
which they lean, something soft and comforting, and yet it is also 
divisive, indistinct, “solid.”   
 Discussing individuals and individualism in the Inferno, 
Robin Kirkpatrick and George Corbett describe the “paradoxical 
state in which the self-exiles itself from self precisely by self-absorp-
tion,” which fits Murphy’s self-love precisely.27 David Tucker 
 
24 Ibid., 20-1. 
25 The phrase ‘tat twam asi’ is from Sanskrit, meaning ‘That thou art’. Martha Dow 
Fehsenfeld and Lois More Overbeck, eds., The Letters of Samuel Beckett: 1929-1940 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1, 350. See also note 3 on p. 353. 
26 Beckett, Murphy, 71. 
27 Robin Kirkpatrick and George Corbett, “Language, Narrative and Ethics,” in 
Dante the Lyric and Ethical Poet, 59. 
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observes that Murphy’s “egotistical self-regard will get the better of 
him and when his own little inferno engulfs him it will be while 
he is in thrall to himself and his self-defeating attempts to will his 
own quietist will-lessness.”28 In the Purgatorio, in contrast to such 
“self-absorption,” there is suddenly an abundance of reciprocated 
facial expressions, and Kirkpatrick has drawn attention to the im-
plications of such expressive detail, arguing that the body in Dante’s 
Purgatorio becomes, “as the Talmudic philosopher Emmanuel 
Levinas would have it, all face.”29 In turn, this face-fullness is 
grounded “in the expressive reciprocations of face recognizing 
face.”30  
 The point of transition in the Commedia between infernal 
self-absorption and purgatorial reciprocation is clear. At the end of 
Purgatorio 1, Dante’s face is washed by Virgil: 
 
 ond’io, che fui accorto di sua arte, 
 porsi ver lui le guance lagrimose: 
 ivi mi fece tutto discoverto 
 quel color che l’inferno mi nascose. (Purg. 1.126-129)  
           
By removing the dust and tears from Dante’s face, Virgil washes 
away traces of the Inferno, and through this tender and intimate act 
he rejuvenates Dante in preparation for the journey to come. To 
borrow Bryden’s phrase, the atmosphere of the Ante-Purgatory 
will incorporate “both light and shade, grief and cheerfulness,”31 
and the emotional and physical qualities of this recognizably terres-
trial setting are expressed largely through a renewed emphasis on 
bodies, in particular Dante’s miraculously solid body,32 but also the 
physical forms of the shades he meets as he ascends the mountain. 
As such, it is clear that Beckett was alert to the “mixture” to be 
discerned in Dante’s purgatorial faces, to the extent to which the 
“muscular dialogue generated by gesture” might include a variety 
of possible emotions and meanings.33And in this respect, Beckett 
was also aware of a fundamental problem, also implicit but not 
 
28 David Tucker, “Murphy, Geulincx and an Occasional(ist) Game of Chess,” in The 
Tragic Comedy of Samuel Beckett: ‘Beckett in Rome’, 17-19 April 2008 comps., 
Daniela Guardamagna and Rossana Sebellin (Università degli Studi di Roma «Tor 
Vergata»: Editori Laterza, 2009), 203. 
29 Kirkpatrick and Corbett, “Language, Narrative and Ethics,” p. 59. 
30 Robin Kirkpatrick, “Dante and the Body,” in Framing Medieval Bodies, eds. Sarah 
Kay and Miri Rubin (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 247. 
31 Bryden, “Beckett and the Three Dantean Smiles,” 31.  
32 See, for instance, Purg. 3.91-93. 
33 In 1931, while lecturing on Molière at Trinity College Dublin, Beckett emphasized 
“muscular dialogue generated by gesture.” James Knowlson, Damned to Fame: The 
Life of Samuel Beckett (London: Bloomsbury, 1996, repr. 1997), 56.  
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developed in the moments noted in the Purgatorio: if face to face 
encounters offer an ethical alternative to solipsism and isolation, 
then they are also precarious, fraught with potential misunderstand-
ing and achieved against the odds.  
 In Watt, Arthur describes the academic committee before 
whom Louit must present his findings, elaborately outlining the 
series of incomplete “looks” passed between the members of the 
committee by explaining that “many, many looks may still be 
taken, and much, much time still lost, ere every eye find the eye it 
seeks, and into every mind the energy flow, the comfort and the 
reassurance, necessary for a resumption of the business in hand.” A 
reciprocated look enables “energy” to “flow”, and such energy is 
both a “comfort” and a “reassurance,” but “of the five times eight 
or forty looks taken, not one” is “reciprocated.”34 Following the 
meeting, Arthur describes the committee members leaving the 
room, followed by Louit and Mr. Nackybal:  
 
And soon after Mr. Nackybal put on his outer clothes and went away. 
And soon after Louit went away. And Louit, going down the stairs, met 
the bitter stout porter Power coming up. And as they passed the porter 
raised his cap and Louit smiled. And they did well. For had not Louit 
smiled, then Power had not raised his cap, and had not Power raised his 
cap, then Louit had not smiled, but they had passed, each on his way, 
Louit down, Power up, the one unsmiling, and the other covered.35 
         
The comedy in this passage is created through the way in which 
Arthur reduces the incident to the barest of facts, while also sug-
gesting that, logically, Louit and the porter Power could easily not 
have responded to one another. Each act is dependent upon the 
other happening, which in turn draws our attention to the unlike-
liness of simultaneous reciprocity. Reciprocity of this kind is un-
doubtedly valuable (“And they did well”) but, in the context of 
Beckett’s writing, successful, communicative interactions such as 
those described in the opening canti of the Purgatorio are most 
likely accidental, the result of two individuals each happening to 
find a “figure” against the “ground.”36  
 Moreover, the difficulty of expressive reciprocity is such that 
even if the problem of timing is overcome, the communication of 
meaning cannot be relied upon. In Dream of Fair to Middling 
Women (first published in 1992), the narrator describes Lucien’s 
strange, indirect manner of speaking (“he did not talk at a person, 
 
34 Samuel Beckett, Watt (London: Calder, 1963, repr. 1998), 177. 
35 Ibid., 196. 
36 Beckett, Murphy, 6. 
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he just balladed around at his own sweet aboulia”), and we are then 
provided with a brief example of such speech: 
 
“A passage in Liebnitz” he said “where he compares matter to a garden 
of flowers and every corpuscle of every fish another pool of fish ...” he 
essayed the gesture and smiled, a drowned smile, “gave me the impres-
sion that Æsthetics were a branch of philosophy.”37 
 
Lucien must “essay” the gesture, by which the narrator means try 
or attempt, and the result is an undoubted failure: “a drowned 
smile.” The narrator goes on to describe the smile as “terrible, as 
though seen through water,” and claims that on the one hand 
“Belacqua wanted to sponge it away,” while on the other Lucien 
“would not abandon the gesture that had broken down and now 
could never be made to mean anything.” The smile is essential to 
Lucien, he “would not abandon it,” but it is meaningless, and its 
effect on Belacqua is to render him uncomfortable enough to want 
to erase it.  
  Similarly, at the beginning of Watt we learn that “Watt had 
watched people smile and thought he understood how it was 
done”: 
 
And it was true that Watt’s smile, when he smiled, resembled more a 
smile than a sneer, for example, or a yawn. But there was something 
wanting to Watt’s smile, some little thing was lacking, and people who 
saw it for the first time, and most people who saw it saw it for the first 
time, were sometimes in doubt as to what expression exactly was in-
tended. To many it seemed a simple sucking of the teeth.  
 
This passage is concluded with a further, single sentence paragraph 
which informs us that “Watt used this smile sparingly.”38 Watt can-
not imbue his smile with meaning in the way that Manfred does in 
Purgatorio 3. Watching others smile, no matter how attentively, is 
not enough for Watt to master the gesture himself, and the result is 
that, more often than not, the people who witness Watt’s smile are 
left confused. Watt’s tendency to pull faces at strangers is an exam-
ple of “la plus intense drôlerie” noticed by Badiou in Beckett’s 
writing; the act is funny, but it is also disconcerting, an example of 
the subject’s dislocation from the external world.39  
 In fact, we learn a little later that Watt’s smile at times even 
 
37 Samuel Beckett, Dream of Fair to Middling Women, ed. Eoin O’Brien and Edith 
Fournier (London: Calder, 1993), 47. Despite being written in the early 1930s, 
Dream of Fair to Middling Women was not published until 1992. 
38 Beckett, Watt, 23. 
39 Alain Badiou, Beckett: L’Increvable désir (Paris: Hachette, 1995), 74.  
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communicates the opposite message to that intended. Having sat 
down in a compartment of a train, Watt notices “a large gentleman 
sitting in the corner diagonally opposed to his.” This man intro-
duces himself (“My name is Spiro”) and we are informed that Watt 
is pleased that, in Mr. Spiro, he has finally met a “sensible man” 
who begins with the “essential and then, working on, would deal 
with the less important matters, one after the other, in an orderly 
way.” In order to reflect his pleasure at this good sense, the narrator 
tells us that “Watt smiled,” and there is a beat as we move to the 
next line where we learn the effect of Watt’s smile: “No offence 
meant, said Mr. Spiro”.40 In this moment, Beckett demonstrates 
both Watt’s solitude (he cannot communicate with Mr. Spiro), as 
well as the futility of hermetic language (the communicative failure 
is a result of the particularity of Watt’s facial expression). In the 
“Verticalist Manifesto” that Beckett signed in 1932, the signatories 
attested to their willingness to “go so far as to invent a hermetic 
language, if necessary.”41 By the time he writes Watt, Beckett em-
bodies the ugliness and painful loneliness of such a language in the 
gestural failures of his protagonist.  
 At the end of the novel, when Watt is about to leave Mr. 
Knott’s house, Watt’s face is said to become “gradually of such va-
cancy that Micks, raising in amaze an astonished hand to a thun-
derstruck mouth, recoiled to the wall, and there stood, in a crouch-
ing posture, his back pressed against the wall, and the back of the 
one hand pressed against his parted lips.” Close attention to Watt’s 
face renders Micks “astonished” and “thunderstruck” in such a sur-
prising fashion that the narrator even suggests it “may have been 
something else”:  
 
[I]t is hard to believe that the face of Watt, dreadful and all as it was at 
the time, was dreadful and all enough to cause a powerful lymphatic man 
like Micks to recoil to the wall with his hands to his face, as if to ward 
off a blow, or press back a cry, in the way he did, and to turn pale, for 
he turned pale, very properly.42  
 
Despite the narrator’s misgivings, the reader is in little doubt that 
the cause of Micks’s reaction is Watt’s face, as the narrator himself 
partly acknowledges by noting that his face turned pale “very 
properly,” and so to speak, understandably. This instance of close 
attention results neither in a social connection nor an ethical 
 
40 Beckett, Watt, 25. 
41 Dougald Macmillan, Transition 1927-38: History of a Literary Era (London: John 
Calder, 1975), 66.  
42 Beckett, Watt, 219. 
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relation to the other, but rather amazement, fear and paralysis. 
 In witnessing the vacancy of Watt’s expression, Micks 
comes, quite literally, face to face with the strangeness of humanity, 
with our capacity to become unrecognizable to one another. There 
is a similarly disconcerting moment towards the end of Murphy. 
Following their game of chess, Murphy helps Mr Endon to bed. In 
doing so, Murphy looks long into his opponent’s eyes, bringing his 
face so close to Mr Endon’s face that they almost touch. Peter Box-
all writes: 
 
Murphy positions himself right in front of Mr Endon - we are told that 
he “took Mr Endon’s head in his hands and brought the eyes to bear on 
his, or rather his on them, across a narrow gulf of air, the merest hand’s 
breadth of air” (Beckett, 1973, 139) - and as he gazes into Mr Endon’s 
empty eyes, the focus of the narrative is on the surface of the eyeball 
itself, the threshold which negotiates the contact between the minds of 
Murphy and Mr Endon. “Approaching his eyes still nearer,” the narra-
tive goes on, Murphy focuses with intensity on the eyeball, discovering 
not ingress to the other, but rather a reflected version of himself, finding 
“in the cornea, horribly reduced, obscured and distorted, his own im-
age” (Beckett, 1973, 140). The reflective surface of Mr Endon’s eye […] 
signals the impenetrability of the threshold of vision, its impassability.43  
 
There is no way through the material surface of Mr Endon’s eye, 
and no way of accessing his mind. The “narrow gulf of air,” small 
enough to suggest a “butterfly kiss” between the two men, is still 
too large.44 And yet a connection is made. In seeing himself 
“blindly reflected in Mr Endon’s eye,” Murphy finds himself “at 
home within the solipsism of the other.”  
 By becoming a “speck in Mr Endon’s unseen,” Murphy 
crosses the “gulf,” but as Boxall argues, this is “only because that 
wall is so glassily intact, only because this becoming other is also a 
peculiarly radical distancing from the other.”45 To return to Robert 
Gordon’s phrase, he finds, quite literally, “a mark of the self in the 
other,” but that mark is dependent upon inescapable isolation.46 
Levinas articulates this two-way movement in “Beyond Intention-
ality” by exclaiming, “A brother despite my strangeness!” 47 Mur-
phy’s strangeness, his alterity to Mr Endon, is absolute, but in that 
alterity he discovers a kind of brotherhood. 
 
43 Peter Boxall, “The Threshold of Vision: The Animal Gaze in Beckett, Coetzee and 
Sebald,” Journal of Beckett Studies 20, no. 2 (2011): 133.   
44 Beckett, Murphy, 139-40. 
45 Boxall, “The Threshold of Vision,” 136.   
46 Gordon, Primo Levi’s Ordinary Virtues, 40. 
47 Levinas, ‘Beyond Intentionality’, 110. 
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 In the Commedia, Dante demonstrates remarkable subtlety 
in his handling of face to face encounters; a later example from the 
Purgatorio would be Dante’s own smile at Statius’ praise for Virgil, 
which is powerful in its simultaneous communication of human 
awkwardness, amusement and generosity (Purg. 21.109). Reflect-
ing upon Dante’s work, Beckett stresses in both Murphy and Watt 
that it is too easy to suggest that we build ethical connections simply 
by looking closely at the faces of others. Every look runs the risk of 
misunderstanding, while each smile or laugh contains a “mixture 
of compassion, patience [and] mockery.”48 However, Dante’s 
poem does insist increasingly upon the possibility that alterity might 
be transformed into perfect community, so that by the time Dante 
encounters the souls of the just in Paradiso, those individuals are 
able to speak at once singularly and in unison: “e sonar ne la voce 
e ‘io’ e ‘mio’, / quand’ era nel concetto e ‘noi’ e ‘nostro’ (Par. 
19.11-12). Such perfect community is not possible in Beckett’s 
writing, and this points to a fundamental difference between the 
two authors and their understanding of the reality of human expe-
rience, which in turn helps to explicate the different kinds of com-
edy (and so laughter) created.  
 Having just arrived at Mr Knott’s house, Watt is provided 
with a “short statement” of advice by the outgoing servant, Arsene, 
and this piece of advice touches upon the range of different laughs 
available to an individual in response to the “whacks, the moans, 
the cracks, the groans, the welts, the squeaks, the belts, the shrieks, 
the pricks, the prayers, the kicks, the tears, the skelps, and the 
yelps.” 49 He explains:  
 
Of all the laughs that strictly speaking are not laughs, but modes of ulu-
lation, only three I think need detain us, I mean the bitter, the hollow 
and the mirthless. They correspond to successive, how shall I say succes-
sive ... suc ... successive excoriations of the understanding, and the pas-
sage from the one to the other is the passage from the lesser to the 
greater, from the lower to the higher, from the outer to the inner, from 
the gross to the fine, from the matter to the form. That laugh that now 
is mirthless once was hollow, the laugh that once was hollow once was 
bitter. And the laugh that once was bitter? Eyewater, Mr. Watt, eye-
water. But do not let us waste our time with that, do not let us waste 
any more time with that, Mr. Watt. No. Where were we? The bitter, 
the hollow and - haw! haw! - the mirthless. The bitter laugh laughs at 
that which is not true, it is the intellectual laugh. Not good! Not true! 
Well well. But the mirthless laugh is the dianoetic laugh, down the snout 
- haw! - so. It is the laugh of laughs, the risus purus, the laugh laughing 
 
48 Beckett, Letters, vol. I, 350.  
49 Beckett, Watt, 37. 
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at the laugh, the beholding, the saluting of the highest joke, in a word 
the laugh that laughs - silence please - at that which is unhappy.50 
 
Arsene does not mention laughter that is joyful. His insistence that 
there is a progression, along with his refusal to “waste any more 
time” on the laugh that “once was bitter,” implies that such laugh-
ter precedes the bitter laugh and as such is no longer worth discuss-
ing. The various laughs to which he refers are ways of shrieking or 
wailing (“modes of ululation”) and they “correspond to successive 
[...] excoriations of understanding.” They are a kind of epistemo-
logical “flaying” in which levels of “understanding” are painfully 
removed until unhappiness (“that which is unhappy”) is finally be-
held.51 
 Arsene’s “risus purus” has been read as an attempt to escape 
suffering by moving beyond intellectual and moral frameworks 
(“Not good! Not true!”), and in such readings it has been suggested 
that through laughter it is possible to perceive the human situation 
more clearly, much as Chaucer’s Troilus does, from the vantage 
point of the “eighthe spere”, 52 following his death and at the con-
clusion of Troilus and Criseyde (“And in himself he lough right at 
the wo”).53 This is how Simon Critchley handles the term in his 
conclusion to On Humour: 
 
For me, it is this smile - deriding the having and the not having, the 
pleasure and the pain, the sublimity and suffering of the human situation 
- that is the essence of humour. This is the risus purus, the highest laugh, 
the laugh that laughs at the laugh, that laughs at that which is unhappy, 
the mirthless laugh of the epigraph to this book. Yet, this smile does not 
bring unhappiness, but rather elevation and liberation, the lucidity of 
consolation. This is why, melancholy animals that we are, human beings 
are also the most cheerful. We smile and find ourselves ridiculous. Our 
wretchedness is our greatness.54 
 
It could be that Arsene is suggesting a way of stepping outside or 
beyond suffering, a way of self-reflexively contemplating unhappi-
ness through a laugh or smile that brings, as Critchley puts it, “el-
evation and liberation, the lucidity of consolation.” If this were the 
case, Arsene would be in good company, for evidence of just such 
thinking can also be found in the writing of Georges Bataille, who 
 
50 Ibid., 45-7. 
51 OED. 1. The action of excoriating; the state of being excoriated: a. the action or 
process of flaying (a man or beast (obs.)). 
52 Chaucer, Troilus and Criseyde in The Riverside Chaucer, ed. Larry Dean Benson 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987, repr. 1988), 584, line 1809. 
53 Ibid., line 1821. 
54 Simon Critchley, On Humour (London: Routledge, 2002), 111. 
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claims in Le Coupable (1961) that “Rire de l’univers libérait ma 
vie. J’échappe à la pesanteur en riant.”55 
 However, both Bataille and Critchley are in danger of im-
plying that laughter is a means of salvation for humanity, a way of 
making suffering (or “wretchedness”) bearable. This is particularly 
the case if too much emphasis is placed on the final sentence of 
Critchley’s book: “Our wretchedness is our greatness.” In On Hu-
mour this quotation stands alone and unacknowledged, but in an 
interview with Shirley Dent, Critchley explains its origins and rea-
sons for inclusion:  
 
It’s a quotation from Pascal. I’ve always been very keen on Pascal, and 
what I’m most keen on in Pascal is his emphasis upon human wretch-
edness. He has a phrase which goes something like “Anxiety, boredom 
and inconstancy, that is the human condition” and I’ve always been very 
partial to that. But obviously for Pascal the flip side of that is religious 
experience, that experience of God that would transform or redeem 
your wretchedness. I’ve long wanted to have an occasion to include it 
in something I wrote and that’s why it’s there.56 
 
Critchley claims that there is a redemptive or transformative “side” 
to Pascal, a sense in which the wretchedness of humanity can in 
some way be seen afresh as a cause for celebration. This may be the 
case for Pascal but it is not so for Beckett. While there may be, as 
Critchley goes on to argue in the interview, “a black sun at the 
heart of the coloured universe,” and so “something melancholy at 
the heart of humour,” for Beckett the mixture of melancholia and 
comedy never permits avoidance of the human reality. There is no 
means of transcendence, redemption or liberation.  
 This is apparent in Watt if the couple of lines following 
Arsene’s definition of the “risus purus” are included in the discus-
sion. Arsene describes the various laughs, defines the “risus purus,” 
and then states: 
 
Personally of course I regret all. All, all, all. Not a word, not a ----. But 
have I not been over that already? I have? Then let me speak rather of 
my present feeling, which so closely resembles the feeling of sorrow, so 
closely that I can scarcely distinguish between them.57 
 
Arsene is consumed with regret (“All, all, all”) and the feeling that 
 
55 Georges Bataille, Le Coupable (Paris: Gallimard, 1998), 31. 
56 “Culture Wars” is the reviews website of the Institute of Ideas (IOI) in London. 
The interview can be read here: http://www.culturewars.org.uk/2002-12/simon-
critchley.htm.  
57 Beckett, Watt, 47. 
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he has now is neither sorrow nor happiness, but rather a feeling that 
“so closely resembles the feeling of sorrow” that he can “scarcely 
distinguish between them.” His regret collapses the distinction be-
tween feelings and leaves him with what he can only describe as 
that which “resembles” sorrow. Moreover, his awareness of the 
“risus purus” certainly does not permit “elevation,” “liberation” or 
“the lucidity of consolation.” He is trapped in a repetitive cycle 
centered around his “regret,” and this “regret” bleeds into his “pre-
sent feeling”: “But have I not been over that already? I have?”   
 In Fin de Partie / Endgame (French 1957, English 1958), 
Nell makes a statement similar to that of Arsene, claiming that 
“Nothing is funnier than unhappiness, I grant you that.” This 
phrase is frequently taken out of context and placed all too con-
veniently alongside Arsene’s definition of the “risus purus.”58 The 
dialogue from Endgame reads as follows: 
 
Nell:  [Without lowering her voice.] Nothing is funnier than  
  unhappiness, I grant you that. But -  
Nagg:  [Shocked.] Oh! 
Nell:  Yes, yes, it’s the most comical thing in the world. And we 
laugh, we laugh, with a will, in the beginning. But it’s always 
the same thing. Yes, it’s like the funny story we have heard too 
often, we still find it funny, but we don’t laugh any more. 
[Pause.] Have you anything else to say to me? 59 
 
The “But –” is often omitted by critics in a hurry to simplify Nell’s 
statement. Following Nagg’s shocked interruption, Nell describes 
the hollowing of laughter, the sense in which, while “unhappiness” 
may be “the most comical thing in the world [...] in the begin-
ning,” it becomes “like the funny story we have heard too often”: 
“we still find it funny, but we don’t laugh any more.” This laughter 
is neither redemptive nor transformative; it drains away over time, 
becoming terribly serious as the person laughing realizes that laugh-
ter is not pure, that the purity of the “risus purus” derives from the 
object of laughter, from “unhappiness.” For Dante, smiles and 
laughter in the Paradiso are ultimately an expression of pure joy at 
creation, at our creation by “l’amor che move il sole e l’altre stelle” 
(Par. 33.145). In contrast, for Beckett, “unhappiness” and suffering 
are the bottom line of existence, and our laughter in response is 
 
58 See for example Rolf Breuer, “Paradox in Beckett,” The Modern Language Re-
view 88, no. 3 (July, 1993): 572. 
59 Beckett, Endgame in The Complete Dramatic Works (London: Faber, 1986, repr. 
1990), 101. 
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always a complex “mixture” of pleasure and protest, bitterness and 
regret. 
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